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Abstract
In a model with a unionised immobile labour force we analyse how
labour taxes and transfers towards unemployed workers are optimally cho-
sen when a welfare maximising government faces oligopolistic and partly
mobile firms. We consider two polar types of government: one whose
objective consists of maximising the sum of domestic producer’s and con-
sumers’ surplus and one that aims at maximising employed and unem-
ployed workers’ payoffs. We show that depending on the combination of
foreign labour costs, the degree of domestic union bargaining power, and
the sunk costs of relocation, the former type of government may choose
to set taxes so as to induce an outward relocation of production.
Keywords: outward FDI, import competition, wage bargaining, oligopoly,
labour taxation, redistribution, political economy
JEL classification: H30, J30, J50, L13
1 Introduction
In recent years, many industrialised countries have experienced considerable
outward relocation of production activities. Not surprisingly, due to its direct
impact on employment, offshoring has become an increasingly important topic
in public debate, particularly in countries that are characterized by high un-
employment and low job creation.1 The sectors predominantly affected by off-
shoring consist among others of car manufacturing and automotive components,
machinery, metalworking, and electronic appliances. Recently also impersonal
∗I am profoundly indebted to Ana B. Ania for continuous support and detailed com-
ments. Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude to Ingrid Kubin, Andreas Wagener,
and Christoph Weiss and to participants at the EARIE in Amsterdam 2006 for very helpful
suggestions. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund is also gratefully acknowl-
edged.
1We refer to offshoring as the shift of a final stage of production, such as the assembly of
a final product. In the literature, the terms offshoring and outsourcing are frequently used
interchangeably where the latter refers to contracting out some production stage to outside
providers, that is, it applies only to intermediate products.
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services that can be delivered electronically over longer distances such as finan-
cial, legal and information services have experienced a rise in offshoring. The
chosen destinations suggest that a key determinant for the choice of produc-
tion location is the cost of labour. Consequently, trade unions are frequently
blamed for the trend in moving production to lower wage countries.2 Yet, the
competitiveness of a location is also part of the scope of responsibility of the
government. Being in charge of redistributive policy, which is financed in part
by distortionary labour taxation, the government also affects the profitability
and competitiveness of firms through its impact on labour costs (Alesina and
Perotti (1997)). As is well known from the tax incidence literature, the presence
of unions implies that a part of the wage tax burden is shifted from employ-
ees to employers resulting in higher wage costs and higher unemployment (e.g.
Lockwood (1990), Goerke (1999), Koskela (2001), and Nickell (2003)). This is
particularly evident in some European countries. Accordingly, a frequent policy
recommendation expressed by the OECD is to reduce labour taxes.3 However,
in contemplating such a reduction, governments are obviously concerned about
its implications on welfare and on the capacity of implementing social insurance
and redistributive policies.4 This is the focus of our paper which builds upon
two strands of literature, namely the literature on foreign direct investment
(FDI) and the literature on non-competitive labour markets and taxation. The
question we address is whether, in the presence of unemployment, governments
should choose their labour tax and redistributive policies so as to discourage
mobile firms from offshoring.
Most of the literature analysing the welfare implications of (inward or outward)
FDI in the presence of unionised labour markets focuses on the conflict of inter-
est between unions and firms without considering public policy (e.g. Zhao (1995,
1998), Naylor and Santoni (1998), Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Lommerud et
al. (2003) Skaksen (2004)). Exceptions are Bughin and Vannini (1995), Leahy
and Montagna (2000), and Skaksen (2005) who quantify the potential welfare
gain of inward FDI which serves as a measure for a subsidy. Another strand
of literature analyses the incentives of governments to attract inward FDI by
means of capital taxes. As noted by Desai et al. (2004), studies on the effect of
tax policy on the location of FDI focus almost exclusively on corporate income
taxes. To our knowledge, with the exceptions of Andersen (2003) and Aronsson
and Sjo¨gren (2004), the role of distortionary labour taxation on the cost side
of mobile firms and its welfare implications have received little attention. In
the spirit of the latter, we assume that firms shift their production offshore not
because of capital tax considerations but, rather, because they want to have
2Even though the number of union members in the OECD has declined in the last two
decades, the share of employed whose remuneration and working conditions are directly or
indirectly determined by collective bargaining is considerable. In the EU it ranged from 30%
in the UK, 68% in Germany, 90% in Belgium, Finland, France and Sweden, to 95% in Austria
in the year 2000 (OECD 2004).
3See OECD (2006, 1994). For a discussion on the tax systems in the European Union, the
effects of tax reforms, and the tax burden on labour in particular, see Joumard (2001).
4In the EU25, labour tax revenues, which represent around half of total tax receipts, finance
most of the social welfare programs in these countries (see European Commission (2006)).
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access to lower labour input costs which in turn are affected by the way the
labour market is organised as well as by labour tax and unemployment insur-
ance policies.
Our model extends Bughin and Vannini’s (1995) FDI model by incorporating a
government that collects taxes from wage income which it uses to redistribute
to the unemployed originating from the presence of a labour union. The tax
rate and the transfer are linked together through the government’s budget con-
straint which implies that there is actually just one independent policy instru-
ment. Additionally to a non-competitive labour market the government faces
non-competitive firms which differ regarding their mobility. We focus on a do-
mestic market in which a domestically-located branch plant of a foreign-owned
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) competes for market shares with a domestic
firm. The MNE is assumed to be more ‘footloose’ than the domestic firm; ac-
cordingly, it may relocate its plant across the jurisdiction’s border whereas the
domestic firm is assumed to be immobile. In our framework, labour taxation
affects the product market competition since it influences the cost conditions
under which firms compete. Consequently, an asymmetric situation may arise
in which the MNE relocates its plant abroad and exports its output to the do-
mestic market thereby competing with the domestic firm under different cost
conditions. Being able to influence the mobile firm’s location decision, the gov-
ernment must choose its optimal labour tax and transfer policy so as to generate
the highest level of welfare. We thus focus on the interactive behavior of mobile
and immobile firms, the union and the government. The questions addressed
include the following: How does relocation affect domestic welfare? What role
does union bargaining strength play? Which tax policy is preferable from the
point-of-view of workers, the unemployed, the domestic firm, and the MNE?
There is a consensus that the recent economic transformations, often referred
to as globalisation, which originate from the increased mobility of resources,
affect workers in different ways than they affect firms. Indeed, international
relocations of production are frequently believed to generate distributive effects
expressed in productivity gains and higher profits but also in lower wages and
job destruction in the source countries. Therefore, we allow the government to
attribute different weights to the rents of producers and consumers, on the one
hand, and to the rents going to employed and unemployed workers in the form
of net labour income and unemployment benefits, on the other hand. It turns
out that the answers to the questions addressed, critically depend on the gov-
ernment’s choice of weights. A government that is mainly concerned about the
domestic producer and consumer rents chooses a low tax rate and/or transfer in
order to expand output. We show that if the mobile firm’s incentive to relocate
is sufficiently strong - as measured by the sunk relocation costs, the domestic
employers’ union bargaining strength, and foreign labour costs - the government
can induce a relocation without raising taxes too much. The stronger are the
incentives for the mobile firm to move production abroad, the more likely it
is that the domestic producer and consumers are better off if the mobile firm
produces abroad rather than at home. The reason is that, confronted with im-
port competition from the lower wage country, it is optimal for the government
3
to counteract the distortion in the domestic labour market by setting lower
taxes, thereby increasing the competitiveness of the domestic firm vis-a`-vis the
relocated competitor. Indeed, as we shall see, output may increase to such an
extent that the domestic producer and the consumers are better off when the
competing firm offshores. If, however, the government places sufficient weight
on workers’ incomes it is optimal for the government to set its policy instru-
ments so as to discourage the mobile firm from relocating.
These results are in marked contrast to those of Bughin and Vannini (1995)
who in a similar framework, albeit without a public sector, analyse the effect of
inward FDI on welfare. In their model the domestic union is indifferent as to
whether a relocation takes place or not as long as the foreign MNE is unionised
if it produces in the host country. The reason is that the competitive wage,
which in their model is the union threat point, adjusts to the different market
outcome so as to leave domestic employment and the union rent unchanged.
The domestic firm, on the other hand, is unambiguously better off when the
competitor produces abroad because in that case the domestic wage remains
lower. On the whole, welfare is always lower when the MNE produces in the
domestic country rather than abroad.
As mentioned above, a recent contribution by Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2004) who,
in a multi-country model, focus on optimal labour taxation and policy coordina-
tion when firms are mobile and labour is unionised is also related to our paper.
In their framework firms are perfectly competitive and identical. Moreover, the
fact that firms may relocate to another jurisdiction implies that the potential
profit obtainable abroad, which is treated as exogenous, can be used as a threat
during wage negotiations. Contrary to our model, in a subgame perfect equi-
librium a relocation of production doesn’t take place. As to the time sequence
of events, we assume that the choice of location takes place prior to the wage
negotiation process. As a result, in contrast to Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2004),
the outside profit is not used by firms as a tool to moderate wage claims during
wage bargaining. Rather, the government directly determines the disagreement
point of wage negotiations through the choice of the tax and transfer policy.
Thus it strategically affects the location decision of the mobile firm.
The link between increased firm mobility and wage tax revenues when workers
are assumed to be immobile has also been investigated by Andersen (2003).
The focus is however different as he discusses the role of the institutional labour
market structure in maintaining a universal social security system in the face of
a heightened need for welfare arrangements. He shows that tighter international
integration increases the distortionary consequences of labour taxation, thereby
putting the public sector under pressure.
As Bughin and Vannini (1995), Leahy and Montagna (2000) and Lommerud
et al. (2003), we take a partial equilibrium approach which presumes that the
income of consumers is sufficiently high relative to their expenditures on the
goods of the industry under consideration. Our model endogenises wages and
unemployment benefits. Therefore, to be strict about the validity of our welfare
results, the best way to interpret our model is by considering consumers, pro-
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ducers, employed and unemployed workers to be separate groups.5 Although
we are aware of the limitations involved, we believe that the present work con-
stitutes a useful first step in capturing the interplay between a government, a
union, and mobile and immobile firms, in that it allows us to easily identify
combinations of union bargaining strength, foreign labour costs, and relocation
costs where an outward relocation could be profitable. Provided that the share
of income devoted to the consumption of the good in the relevant market is not
too large, the main qualitative results should continue to go through in a more
general framework.
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In section 3
we analyse how firms choose their output levels. Section 4 looks at the alterna-
tive interactions between the union and the firms and derives the equilibrium
wages with and without offshoring. In section 5 we show how the relocation
decision depends on the government policy. Finally, section 6 derives the opti-
mal tax policy and carries out welfare comparisons among the different regimes.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We focus on a duopoly producing a homogeneous good which is sold in a coun-
try referred to as the domestic or host country. Both firms face a unionised
labour force. In the background there is a second country, referred to as the
foreign country which is exogenous in our model. We depart from a situation
where both firms are located in the domestic country. Firm 1 is assumed to be
domestically owned and immobile, whereas firm 2 is a branch plant of a foreign-
based MNE that has the option of moving production abroad where it can serve
the domestic market by means of exports. There is a domestic government that
aims to maximise welfare being aware that its tax and transfer policy affects the
firms’ investment and cross-border location decisions and hence the level of do-
mestic production and employment. The tax revenues are entirely redistributed
towards the unemployed.
We analyse two different scenarios. In the first scenario both firms produce in
the domestic country. In the second scenario the MNE branch has relocated
abroad and competes with the immobile domestic firm via exports to the do-
mestic market. Whereas in the former case both firms are subject to wage
negotiations with a domestic union, in the latter scenario firm 2 faces exoge-
nously given foreign labour input costs.
Reflecting the time sequence of events, our problem takes the following form:
First, the domestic government chooses its tax and transfer policy anticipating
its impact on the wage bargaining process and thus on the location decision of
the MNE. Subsequently, given the government policy variables, the MNE de-
cides where to set up its plant. Depending on the production location of the
mobile firm, the domestic union bargains over the wage rate with either both
5That is to say, the consumers of the good considered obtain their income from some other
source whereas the workers in the industry are not consumers of the goods produced.
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the domestic and the foreign firm, or with the domestic firm alone, taking into
consideration the prevailing given foreign wage rate facing the competitor lo-
cated abroad. Finally, each firm chooses its optimal output and employment
levels given the equilibrium wage rates in both firms. The problem is solved
recursively by backwards induction.
3 Output and employment
Both firms produce a homogeneous good in the domestic country facing a linear
inverse product demand function of the form:
p(Q) = a− cQ (1)
where p is the output price and Q =
∑2
i=1 qi is the sum of individual quantities
produced by firms 1 and 2. To simplify computations we assume a = 2 and
c = 1.
Labour is the only factor of production. Each firm i has access to the same
technology which is normalised so that 1 unit of output is produced with 1 unit
of labour where labour is remunerated at a wage rate of ωi. Consequently, the
profit functions are
πi = [p(Q)− ωi]qi, i = 1, 2 (2)
Each firm i takes the wage outcome (ω1, ω2) resulting from wage bargaining as
given and strategically chooses its output level, qi, so as to maximise its profit.
The resulting equilibrium output of firm i is a function of both firms’ labour
costs and given by
qi(ωi, ωj) =
2− 2ωi + ωj
3
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j (3)
reflecting that in strategic quantity-setting behavior the optimal choice of out-
put by firm i depends on the output produced in the competing firm j. The
expression for profits can be written as follows
πi(ωi, ωj) = [qi(ωi, ωj)]
2, i, j = 1, 2 (4)
4 The labour market and union-firm bargaining
In this section we present the features of the domestic labour market and de-
rive the equilibrium domestic wage rate. We begin by analysing the case where
both firms produce in the domestic country (section 4.1) and then turn to the
scenario where the MNE has moved its plant offshore (section 4.2).
The labour market is characterized by internationally immobile workers. There
is a constant total domestic labour force which we normalise to 1. All em-
ployed workers are represented by one union. We assume “right-to-manage”
wage formation meaning that the firms and the union bargain over the wage
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rate and, subsequently, each firm i chooses the output and employment level,
qi, unilaterally. Moreover, we abstract from workers’ choices of allocating time
between work and leisure and assume that the individual labour supply is in-
elastic. Workers employed at firm i earn a net-of-tax income ωi(1−τ) where τ is
the wage income tax rate. Unemployed workers are entitled to receive net-of-tax
unemployment benefits amounting to b.
4.1 The equilibrium wage without relocation
In this case the objective of the union is to maximise the following union rent:
Θ =
2∑
i=1
(ωi − γ) (1− τ) qi(ωi, ωj) i = 1, 2, i 6= j (5)
for ωi ≥ γ where γ = b/(1 − τ) can be interpreted as the gross unemployment
benefit level. The level of b and τ , and thus γ, are treated as exogenous by
the union as they are chosen by the government at a prior stage. Notice that
the union has two opposing goals; on the one hand, it aims at bargaining a
wage rate in excess of the gross benefit as high as possible; on the other hand,
it strives to achieve a level of employment as high as possible. The objective
of each firm, on the other side, is to maximise its profit. It is standard in the
literature on union-firm bargaining to allow for exogenous relative bargaining
strength during wage contract negotiations making use of the Nash bargaining
product
Ω(ωi, ωj) = Θ
α
[ 2∑
i=1
πi(ωi, ωj)
]1−α
(6)
This formulation implies that the union and the firms have a relative bargaining
power of α and 1 − α, respectively, with 0 < α < 1.6 If there is no agreement
as to the splitting of contract rents between the firms and the union, the nego-
tiations break down and each party ends up receiving the fall-back payoff. In
particular, an equilibrium wage rate at or below the level of the gross transfer
payment that is guaranteed in case of becoming unemployed would bring the
negotiations to a halt. In that case workers would become unemployed receiving
b and firms would cease production.7
Among the total number of workers in the labour force, qi are employed at
firm i and 1 −
∑2
i=1 qi are unemployed. If the labour market were competi-
tive, the prevailing wage rate had to equate total labour supply and demand,
Q(ωi, ωj), and would hence correspond to ωc = 1/2. Confronted with a situation
6We assume that both firms are represented by a joint bargaining entity, e.g. an employer’s
association implying that the firms’ bargaining power is identical. Wage bargaining is thus
realized so as to maximise the industry profit, whereas output is decided so as to maximise
the individual profit. In effect, firms compete in the output market but they bargain jointly
for wages.
7In the course of the analysis we will introduce conditions that guarantee that negotiations
do not break down in equilibrium, that is, the union will not settle for a wage rate lower than
γ.
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in which γ < ωc, unemployed individuals would prefer to work under competi-
tive conditions rather than being unemployed, making negotiations futile from
the viewpoint of firms and workers. Therefore, we assume that γ ≥ 1/2.
Notice that we are confronted with a symmetric case in the sense that both the
good being produced and the labour force are homogeneous. Consequently, the
union treats all workers equally so that the equilibrium wage arising from wage
bargaining between the firms and the union is going to be identical for all em-
ployed workers, regardless of the particular firm they are employed at. Further-
more, according to equation (3) the output level is also symmetric amounting
to q(ω) = 13 (2 − ω) where ω = ωi = ωj . As a consequence, the outcome of the
bargain will be the wage rate that maximises the following Nash product
Ω(ω) =
[
2 (ω − γ) (1− τ)q(ω)
]α[
2[q(ω)]2
]1−α
(7)
resulting in
ω(α, γ) = α+
(2− α)
2
γ (8)
with 1/2 ≤ γ ≤ 2, where the latter constraint guarantees that the negotiated
gross wage is larger than or equal to the gross benefit. One can easily verify
that the second order condition for a maximum is fulfilled, Ωωω < 0.
As expected, the wage rate is increasing in α and in γ. Notice that an increase in
the labour tax rate reduces the net wage less than one for one as ∂[ω(1−τ)]
∂τ
= −α,
because a part of the tax burden is shifted on to the employers8 in the form of
higher wage demands by the union
(
∂ω
∂τ
= (2−α)γ2(1−τ) > 0
)
. Hence, as in Lockwood
(1990), the degree of tax shifting is decreasing in α because the union internalizes
the negative consequences of a higher wage on employment, i.e. ∂
2ω
∂α∂τ
< 0.
Given the wage rate (8) we can determine the equilibrium output and em-
ployment from (3):
q(α, γ) =
1
6
(2− α)(2− γ) (9)
An increase in α or γ raises the labour input costs which in turn induces firms to
reduce output and thus labour demand in order to counteract the falling profit.
Notice that in the absence of union power (α = 0) the union is unable to ex-
tract any rents so that the equilibrium wage rate corresponds to the gross benefit
level. Nevertheless, in equilibrium there is always involuntary unemployment
since setting γ at a level that is higher than the competitive wage rate implies
Q(α, γ) < 1.9
We proceed by deriving the equilibrium wage arising in case firm 2 moves off-
shore.
8If the labour market were competitive with inelastic individual labour supplies an increase
in the labour tax would entirely be borne by workers.
9Note that Q(α, γ) < 1 holds if and only if γ > 1−2α
2−α
which is implied by the condition
γ > 1
2
since 0 < α < 1. As such, we can rule out an excess demand for labour.
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4.2 The equilibrium wage with relocation
If the MNE relocates its branch plant abroad, firms 1 and 2 will choose their
output levels according to equation (3) where the foreign wage rate, assumed
1/2 < ω2 ≤ 2, is now exogenous. Both the domestic union and the domestic
firm anticipate the asymmetric game in the product market and bargain over
the domestic wage rate. The Nash bargaining product is given by
Ω(ω1, ω2) =
[
(ω1 − γ)(1− τ)q1(ω1, ω2)
]α[
[q1(ω1, ω2)]
2
]1−α
(10)
and the equilibrium domestic gross wage rate now results in
ω1(α, γ, ω2) =
(2 + ω2)α
4
+
(2− α)
2
γ (11)
where the second order condition for a maximum is fulfilled. As in the previous
section the gross unemployment benefit level is bounded from below and from
above by the competitive and the equilibrium wage rate, respectively, so that
(ω2 − 1)/2 ≤ γ ≤ (2 + ω2)/2 := γ¯(ω2).
10 Given α, γ, and ω2, the comparison of
expressions (8) and (11) reveals that the domestic wage is lower when firm 2 is
competing from abroad rather than when both firms produce domestically.
By substituting (11) in (3) we obtain the equilibrium production and employ-
ment levels:
q1(α, γ, ω2) =
(2− α)
3
[
(2 + ω2)
2
− γ
]
(12)
q2(α, γ, ω2) =
1
6
[
2(4 + α)− (8− α)ω2
2
+ (2− α)γ
]
In order to exclude a situation where one of the firms becomes a monopolist,
equation (3) requires that 2(ω2 − 1) ≤ ω1(α, γ, ω2) ≤ (2 + ω2)/2 which is essen-
tially a condition that guarantees that the domestic wage does not diverge too
much with respect to the foreign wage. The latter constraint is implied by the
upper bound for γ whereas the former constraint is always fulfilled if ω2 ≤ 1.
Note that an increase in the foreign wage improves the relative competitive-
ness of the domestic firm and thus boosts its output. Due to rent splitting the
domestic wage is also increasing in ω2. The total output is given by
q1(α, γ, ω2) + q2(α, γ, ω2) =
1
6
[
2(8− α)− (4 + α)ω2
2
− (2− α)γ
]
(13)
and is decreasing in α, γ, and ω2.
We make it a point that in the event of a relocation of firm 2, it is not clear a
priori how the domestic and foreign labour costs compare. We ask the following
question: given the foreign wage rate, will the domestic wage bargaining parties
10The restriction ω2 ≤ 2 implies that
ω2−1
2
≤ 1
2
and 2+ω2
2
≤ 2. Taking into account the
bounds of γ in the previous section, in the sequel we require 1
2
≤ γ ≤ γ¯(ω2).
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agree on a wage rate that is higher equal or lower than the foreign wage rate? A
symmetric duopoly in the offshoring regime is consistent with ω1(α, γ, ω2) = ω2
and requires that the labour income tax rate and the unemployment benefit are
set such that
γ = γs(α, ω2) :=
(4− α)ω2 − 2α
2(2− α)
(14)
If the government policy variable lies above this symmetry threshold, γ >
γs(α, ω2), the domestic firm and union will agree on a higher wage rate than
that prevailing abroad thus facing a cost disadvantage. Conversely, if γ is set
below the threshold the domestic wage rate will be set at a level that is lower
than the foreign wage rate. Note that the symmetry limiting value γs(α, ω2) is
decreasing in α. Put differently, the stronger the domestic union, the larger the
range of γ that imply a cost advantage to the foreign firm. This illustrates how
the government can in fact determine the conditions under which competition
takes place.
5 The relocation decision
Firm 2 has the option of producing in the domestic country or abroad. A
simple decision rule consists of locating production where the profit net of sunk
relocation costs, K, is highest. These costs may capture factors such as putting
the infrastructure in place, laying off employees at home, hiring and training
new workers, paying legal and consulting fees and the like. As a consequence,
the MNE relocates if
π2(α, γ, ω2)−K ≥ π(α, γ) (15)
where π2(α, γ, ω2) denotes the profit of firm 2 if it produces in the foreign
country. This condition can be restated as q22(α, γ, ω2) −K ≥ q
2(α, γ). Using
expressions (9) and (12) we find that a relocation occurs if
γ ≥ γr(α, ω2,K) :=
(8− α)ω2 − 6α+ ∆
−1(α, ω2)K
4(2− α)
(16)
with ∆(α, ω2) =
(8−α)(2−ω2)
122 . Given the union strength, the foreign wage rate,
and the sunk costs, the location choice therefore is determined indirectly by the
governmental choice of the tax and transfer policy.
Note that 1/2 ≤ γr(α, ω2,K) ≤ γ(ω2) if and only if K(α, ω2) ≤ K ≤ K(α, ω2)
where K(α, ω2) := [α(4 + ω2)− 4(2ω2 − 1)] ∆(α, ω2) and K(α, ω2) := (4 +
α)(2− ω2)∆(α, ω2).
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It is easily checked that the relocation threshold increases with ω2 and K and
decreases with α so that higher foreign wages, higher relocation costs, and a
weaker domestic union increase the range of γ for which firm 2 does not relo-
cate, thus making a relocation less likely, i.e. ∂γr(α,ω2,K)
∂ω2
> 0, ∂γr(α,ω2,K)
∂K
> 0,
and ∂γr(α,ω2,K)
∂α
< 0.
11We do not exclude negative costs that may arise from governmental efforts abroad aimed
at attracting FDI such as tax concessions, subsidies and other infrastructure facilitation.
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In the preceding section we identified a threshold for the government policy
variable, γ, below and above which the duopoly becomes asymmetric. Specif-
ically, we know that if γ < γs(α, ω2) the bargained domestic wage rate in the
relocation regime is below the foreign wage rate and vice versa. Obviously,
having derived the condition under which firm 2 relocates, it would be inter-
esting to explore whether and how asymmetric labour costs arise in the relo-
cation regime. Straightforward comparison yields that γr(α, ω2,K) ≤ γs(α, ω2)
if K ≤ K∗(α, ω2) := α(2 − ω2)∆(α, ω2) where K
∗(α, ω2) < K(α, ω2).
12 The
implications of this result are summarised in the following two lemmata which
will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1: If relocation costs are sufficiently low, namely, K(α, ω2) ≤ K ≤
K∗(α, ω2), there exists an interval for γ, γ ∈]γr(α, ω2,K); γs(α, ω2)[ where the
MNE finds it optimal to relocate abroad even though the equilibrium domestic
wage is below the foreign wage after relocation.
Lemma 1 captures the idea that a decrease in K increases the attractiveness
of relocating and thus the mobile firm starts to relocate for lower values of γ,
that is, the relocation threshold decreases. A decrease in γ, in turn, reduces
the domestic wage rate. If costs are sufficiently low, the MNE shifts produc-
tion abroad even though it anticipates that wages will be lower in the domestic
country than abroad due to the pressure that offshoring imposes on the wage
negotiation. Put differently, there is a range of γ where relocation occurs, yet
the domestic union moderates its wage claims to such an extent that the do-
mestic firm ends up having a higher market share than the relocating firm.
Figure 1 below illustrates how the level of gross unemployment benefits can be
split into three intervals; values of γ between γ := 1/2 and γr(α, ω2,K) give rise
to the symmetric equilibrium where both firms produce domestically; if γ takes
on a value between γr(α, ω2,K) and γ¯(ω2), offshoring takes place in which case
the threshold γs(α, ω2) determines which of the firms has a competitive advan-
tage. Although there is empirical evidence that increased import competition
from low-wage countries in specific sectors tends to reduce wages in those sec-
tors (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996 and 1999), Egger et al (2001), Geishecker
(2002)), we do not usually observe that labour costs fall below those prevalent
in the offshore destination countries. Lemma 2 provides a condition that results
in equilibria where the wage rate remains lower in the foreign country than in
the domestic country.
Lemma 2: If relocation costs are sufficiently high, i.e. K∗(α, ω2) < K ≤
K(α, ω2), then γr(α, ω2,K) > γs(α, ω2) and a relocation always implies that
domestic labour costs are higher than foreign labour costs so that the MNE al-
ways increases its market share after relocation.
12At this point it is not relevant for the results whether or not K < K∗. Note, however,
that K < K∗ requires α < α(ω2) :=
2(2ω2−1)
ω2+1
, a condition that shall be of use later on (cf.
section 6.1.3).
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Figure 1: Dependence of the equilibrium wages on the choice of the wage tax rate
and the unemployment benefit, given K, α, and ω2. In this figure we assume that
costs, K, are as low as proposed in lemma 1 so that the relocation threshold, γr, is
below the symmetry threshold, γs, implying that the relocation equilibrium may be
consistent with domestic wages being lower than foreign wages.
Analogous to lemma 1, lemma 2 simply reflects that high relocation costs
and high domestic labour costs are two sides of the same coin. By rendering a
relocation less attractive, high relocation costs strengthen the bargaining posi-
tion of the domestic labour union in the sense that the fallback payoff of workers,
γ, rises. Figure 2 depicts such a situation.
? ?),,( 2 Kr ???
221
),,( ???? ?K
0
no relocation relocation
)(??
Figure 2: Offshoring under sufficiently high relocation costs (see lemma 2). In this
case, in the relocation regime domestic wages are always higher than foreign wages.
6 Government policies
So far, we have highlighted the way in which the government’s choice of γ
determines the equilibrium. In this section we derive the optimal tax package
which consists of the labour income tax rate, τ , and the income accruing to the
unemployed in the form of net unemployment benefits, b. Fiscal policy therefore
amounts to taxing working individuals and redistributing the proceeds to the
non-employed. As in the previous sections, we express τ and b in terms of γ,
specifically, γ = b/(1− τ). For simplicity, we parametrise the objective function
of the government using β ∈ [0, 1] as a weight the government attaches to parts of
12
an economic welfare function as measured by the sum of consumer surplus, CS,
and domestic producer surplus, PS, the net income accruing to the employed,
E, and the net transfers to the unemployed, U .13 Specifically, the social welfare
function takes the form
W = β [CS + PS] + (1− β) [E + U ] (17)
In order to get a better understanding of the forces at work, we only analyse
rather polar types of government. In particular, we study 2 cases. First, in
section 6.1, we assume that the government chooses its policy variables so as
to maximise the sum of consumer and producer surplus (β = 1). We shall call
this type of government the ‘pro-business’ government. Subsequently, in section
6.2, we derive the optimal policy of a government whose objective consists of
maximising the sum of net incomes of employed and unemployed individuals
(β = 0). This we label the ‘pro-labour’ government.
6.1 The ‘pro-business’ government: β = 1
Suppose the government attaches full weight to the sum of domestic consumer
and producer surplus. It follows that the objective functions are given by
W (γ) =
{
Wn(γ) = 2q
2(γ) + q2(γ) if 1/2 ≤ γ ≤ γr
Wr(γ) = 0.5 [q1(γ) + q2(γ)]
2
+ q21(γ) if γr ≤ γ ≤ γ(ω2)
(18)
where Wn(γ) represents the government’s objective function when no relocation
takes place, i.e. in the subset of γ between 1/2 and γr, and Wr(γ) denotes the
respective function in the relocation regime, i.e. for γ between γr and γ(ω2).
In both equations the first term on the right-hand side expresses the consumer
surplus defined as
∫ Q
0
p(Q)dQ − pQ and the second term represents the profit
of the domestic firm. Since in the relocation regime firm 2 serves the domestic
market through exports, both q1(γ) and q2(γ) enter the consumer surplus. Note
that welfare is increasing in (domestic and total) output, which on its part is
decreasing in γ. Thus, it is clear from the outset that the government can
improve its objective by reducing γ as long as γ is strictly above its respective
lower bound.
13Note that E does not coincide with the union rent and that it takes different values
depending on whether offshoring takes place or not. In unionised oligopoly models the union
rent is typically included in national welfare as that part of total producer surplus which is
incorporated by the union (e.g. Bughin and Vannini (1995), Leahy and Montagna(2000), and
Lommerud ed al. (2003)). In our framework, the total producer surplus is partly absorbed by
employed workers (as net wage income) and unemployed workers (as wage tax revenues). In
particular, employed workers transfer some of their rents towards unemployed workers. We
will explicitly introduce the expressions for CS and PS in section 6.1 and the expressions for
E and U in section 6.2. Notice that the weights distinguish our government objective function
from standard welfare functions in that they distort the relative rents.
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6.1.1 No relocation regime
If both firms produce in the domestic country, the Lagrangean can be written
as
L(τ, γ, λ, µ1, µ2) = Wn(γ) + λBn(τ, γ) + µ1(γ −
1
2
) + µ2(γr − γ)
where Bn(τ, γ) denotes the government’s budget given by
Bn(τ, γ) = 2τω(γ)q(γ)− γ(1− τ)[1− 2q(γ)] (19)
In words, the government levies a fraction τ of the wage income and redistributes
the revenue to the unemployed in the form of unemployment benefits, where
γ(1 − τ) is the net benefit and 1 − 2q(γ) is the level of unemployment when
both firms produce in the domestic country. Note that since the equilibrium
unemployment is nonnegative, the budget is increasing in the wage tax rate:
∂Bn
∂τ
= 2ω(γ)q(γ) + γ[1− 2q(γ)] > 0
It immediately follows from the first order condition of the Lagrangean with
respect to τ that λ = 0. Then, the remaining first order conditions are given by
γ :
dWn
dγ
+ µ1 − µ2 = 0, (20)
λ : Bn(τ, γ) ≥ 0, (21)
µ1 : γ −
1
2
≥ 0, (22)
µ2 : γr − γ ≥ 0 (23)
It is straightforward to show that an equilibrium where γ > 1/2 is contradicted
by the complementary slackness conditions,14implying that the equilibrium pol-
icy variable without relocation is given by γn = 1/2. This result conforms with
intuition since, as mentioned above, the government can increase its objective
by reducing γ. The equilibrium wage and output are thus given by
ω(α) =
1
4
(2 + 3α) and q(α) =
1
4
(2− α)
Recall, however, that even for γ = 1/2 there will be positive unemployment in
the presence of a union. Consequently, the government must set the wage tax
rate so as to finance the redistribution. A balanced-budget policy would result
in
τn(α) =
γ[1− 2q(γ)]
γ[1− 2q(γ)] + 2ω(γ)q(γ)
(24)
=
2α
4 + 3α(2− α)
14Note that γ > 1/2 requires that µ1 = 0 so that condition (20) becomes
dWn
dγ
= 6q(γ) ∂q
∂γ
=
µ2 < 0 contradicting the condition that the Lagrange multiplier must be nonnegative.
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Observe that the tax rate is increasing in the union power because unemploy-
ment rises with α at a higher rate than taxable income, ω(α)q(α). Therefore, in
order to satisfy the budget constraint the tax rate must rise with α to accom-
modate the higher number of recipients of unemployment benefits. Moreover,
the tax rate is convex in α which is a feature that is linked to the degree of tax
shifting. Remember that a stronger union is associated with a lower degree of
tax shifting. Knowing that the effect of a marginal increase in the tax rate on
labour input costs is weakening in α, the government finds it optimal to increase
τn(α) more than proportionally when α rises in order to finance the increased
demand for welfare transfers resulting from higher unemployment.
The level of the net unemployment benefit is given by
bn(α) = γn [1− τn(α)] (25)
=
1
2
[
4 + α(4− 3α)
4 + 3α(2− α)
]
Accordingly, a rise in the negotiating strength of the union implies that less will
be paid to each unemployed worker.
6.1.2 Relocation regime
We now turn to consider how the ‘pro-business’ government chooses its policy
instruments when firm 2 produces abroad. The Lagrangean becomes
Γ(τ, γ, σ, δ1, δ2) = Wr(γ) + σBr(τ, γ) + δ1(γ − γr) + δ2(γ − γ)
where the budget constraint reads
Br(τ, γ) = τω1(γ)q1(γ)− γ(1− τ)[1− q1(γ)] (26)
Like in the previous case, the objective function reaches its maximum when γ is
lowest, i.e. γ = γr(α, ω2,K) where the proof is analogous to that in the previous
section.15 This implies that the equilibrium wage and output levels are
ω1(α, ω2,K) =
1
8
[
(8 + α)ω2 − 2α+ ∆
−1(α, ω2)K
]
(27)
and
q1(α, ω2,K) =
1
12
[
(2− ω2)(4 + α)−∆
−1(α, ω2)K
]
(28)
q2(α, ω2,K) =
1
24
[
(2− ω2)(8− α) + ∆
−1(α, ω2)K
]
15Suppose that γ − γr > 0. The complementary slackness conditions then imply that
δ1 = 0. Hence, the first order condition on γ becomes (dWr)/(dγ) = δ2. Note however that
dWr
dγ
= [q1(γ) + q2(γ)]
(
∂(q1+q2)
∂γ
)
+ 2q1(γ)
∂q1
∂γ
< 0. Therefore, in equilibrium we have that
γ = γr.
15
It follows that q1(α, ω2,K)+q2(α, ω2,K) =
1
24
[
(2− ω2)(16 + α)−∆
−1(α, ω2)K
]
.
A balanced-budget fiscal policy would result in the following wage tax rate and
net unemployment benefit
τr(α, ω2,K) =
γr[1− q1(γr)]
γr[1− q1(γr)] + ω1(γr)q1(γr)
br(α, ω2,K) = γr(1− τr) (29)
It is easy to check that K < K implies that the impact of α on the wage rate
and on output is inverted with respect to the regime without relocation.
Lemma 3: Assume β = 1. In the relocation regime the domestic wage is de-
creasing in α and, correspondingly, the employment and output levels of the
domestic firm are increasing in α.
This seemingly paradoxical effect captures an important feature of the inter-
action between the union, the mobile firm, and the ‘pro-business’ government.
Firms anticipate that higher values of α imply tougher wage negotiations and
therefore are willing to relocate for lower values of γ. At the same time, the gov-
ernment will set the lowest possible γ consistent with relocation. The final effect
on workers is that the union will end up settling for a lower wage. To see this, it
is useful to rewrite the wage function explicitly as ω1(α, γr(α, ω2,K), ω2). Tak-
ing the total derivative of the domestic wage rate with respect to α in equation
(11), evaluated at the optimum, we obtain ∂ω1
∂α
+ ∂ω1
∂γr
∂γr
∂α
< 0. Put differently,
a rise in α compels the government to set a lower γ, which is captured by the
second term on the right-hand side, and thus worsens the fall-back payoff of
workers. This last effect is responsible for the negative impact of α on the do-
mestic wage rate.
As to the effect of ω2 on domestic output, it, too, is inverted. An increase in
the foreign wage renders the option of relocating less attractive for firm 2. This
implies that the government will set a higher γ which exerts a positive impact on
domestic wages and thus decreases domestic output. Specifically, from equation
(12) we obtain ∂q1
∂ω2
+ ∂q1
∂γr
∂γr
∂ω2
< 0 where ∂q1
∂ω2
> 0 .
6.1.3 The welfare impact of offshoring
Having derived the equilibrium levels of output with and without relocation,
we are now in a position to ask whether, from the perspective of the ‘pro-
business’ government, it is optimal to avoid or induce offshoring. Recalling
that this type of government attaches positive weight only to the surplus of the
domestic producer and consumers, we first explore how the former is affected by
a relocation of the MNE. Then, we do the same exercise regarding the impact
on consumers. Finally, we consider the welfare effects on workers.
For an assessment of the gains or losses in domestic profits it suffices to compare
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the respective output levels given by (9) and (12) in the optimum. We find that
q1(α, γr, ω2) T q(α, γn) ⇔ 2γr − γn ⋚ ω2 (30)
Surprisingly, the domestic firm may benefit from the relocation of the com-
petitor. In particular, offshoring benefits (harms) the domestic producer if the
difference between the chosen domestic tax/transfer package with and without
relocation is not too large (small) with respect to the foreign labour costs. In
other words, given γn = 1/2, the domestic firm will enjoy higher profits in
the offshoring regime if domestic labour is not too costly with regard to foreign
labour. As the wage rate in firm 1 is increasing in γr, which in turn is increasing
in K, condition (30) holds if
K ⋚ K◦(α, ω2) := [5α+ 2− (4 + α)ω2] ∆(α, ω2) (31)
where K < K◦ < K.
Proposition 1: Assume β = 1. If relocation costs are sufficiently low relative
to the union’s negotiation power and to foreign wages, K < K < K◦(α, ω2), the
domestic producer benefits from an outward relocation of the MNE.
As mentioned in lemma 1, the option of relocating abroad becomes more
attractive for the foreign firm when the costs associated with such a move de-
crease. As a result, the relocation threshold, γr, falls. Since the ‘pro-business’
government optimally sets γ = γr, lower relocation costs dampen domestic
wages and push up domestic output. In other words, the domestic firm benefits
all the more from import competition, the less costly the relocation is, since
the government optimally reacts by mitigating the distortion in the domestic
labour market setting a lower gross benefit level. The stronger are the incentives
for the mobile firm to move production abroad, the more likely it is that the
domestic producer is better off if the foreign firm produces abroad rather than
at home.16
It is important to emphasise the fact that proposition 1 is independent of
the domestic firm’s market share. Recall, from lemma 2, that relocation costs
K > K∗(α, ω2) result in equilibria where the domestic firm faces higher labour
costs than the firm producing abroad. It thus seems natural to ask whether it
is possible that the domestic firm benefits from a relocation of its competitor
even though domestic labour costs turn out to exceed foreign labour costs and
therefore the domestic firm’s market share is reduced as a result of relocation.
This could happen if K∗ < K◦ and K ∈ [K∗,K◦]. It turns out that such
equilibria exist if the measure of union negotiation strength is sufficiently high
with respect to the foreign labour costs, namely,
α > α(ω2) :=
2(2ω2 − 1)
3
16It can be shown that a rise in the negotiation power of the domestic union decreases
the likelihood that the domestic firm benefits from the competitor’s outward relocation as
∂(K◦−K)
∂α
= −(2ω2 − 1)∆(α, ω2) + (2ω2 − 1)(2− α)
∂∆
∂α
< 0.
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On the other hand, at this point it is convenient to note that K < K∗ requires
α < α(ω2) :=
2(2ω2 − 1)
ω2 + 1
and that α(ω2) < α(ω2).
The previous observations allow as to put forward the following propositions.
Proposition 2: Assume β = 1 and α > α(ω2), then K
∗ < K and for
K ∈ [K,K◦] we have that q1(γr) > q(γn) and q1(γr) < q2(γr).
Proposition 2 builds upon lemma 2 and exploits the fact that α > α implies
that all admissible values of K give rise to equilibria where the domestic wage
rate exceeds the foreign wage rate as K∗ < K. Therefore, if the domestic labour
union is sufficiently strong and costs are below K◦, an outward relocation of the
MNE benefits the domestic firm even though the latter faces higher labour costs
than its relocated competitor. That is, for the domestic firm the relocation of
the MNE is profitable, yet, it comes at the cost of a lower domestic market share.
Proposition 3: Assume β = 1 and α < α(ω2), then K
◦ < K∗ and for
K ∈ [K,K◦] we have that q1(γr) > q(γn) and q1(γr) > q2(γr).
This proposition is related to lemma 1. If the domestic labour union is suf-
ficiently weak and if moving offshore is not too costly (K < K◦), the outward
relocation of the MNE benefits the domestic firm and, furthermore, results in
domestic wages being lower than foreign wages. It thus entails an increase in
the domestic firm’s market share. As stated previously, however, this outcome
might be empirically less relevant.
Proposition 4: Assume β = 1. If the labour union is moderately strong,
α(ω2) < α < α(ω2), and
(i) costs are such that K < K < K∗, then the same conclusion as in proposition
3 prevails;
(ii) costs are as high as K∗ < K < K◦, then we obtain the same conclusion as
in proposition 2.
Proposition 4 sets out conditions on α and ω2 under which K < K
∗ <
K◦ < K. Thus the range of relocation costs under which the domestic firm is
affected positively when the MNE moves its plant offshore can be split into two
intervals: one that gives rise to a labour input cost advantage on the part of
the domestic firm (i), and one that results in a labour cost disadvantage (ii).
To see what the relocation cost constraints entail graphically, figure 3 plots the
various cost thresholds and the respective inequalities assuming a moderately
strong domestic labour union as in proposition 4.
Regarding the domestic consumer surplus, we can perform a similar exercise.
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Figure 3: Offshoring assuming a moderately strong union as in proposition 4.
The comparison of consumer surplus with and without relocation yields:
q1(α, γr, ω2) + q2(α, γr, ω2) > 2q(α, γn)
if γr − 2γn <
6α− (4 + α)ω2
2(2− α)
(32)
Put differently, consumers benefit from offshoring if and only if total output
increases. Condition (32) is fulfilled if
K < K◦◦(α, ω2) :=
[
2(7α+ 4)− (16 + α)ω2
]
∆(α, ω2) (33)
where K < K◦◦. Remark that K◦◦ < K if ω2 > α. Only if the latter inequality
holds, does condition (33) impose any restrictions. It is also noteworthy that
K◦◦ ≥ K◦ if α ≥ α, which leads to the following statements:
Proposition 5: Assume β = 1.
(i) If K < min{K◦,K◦◦}, the transition from the symmetric equilibrium without
relocation to the equilibrium with import competition benefits both the domestic
consumers and the domestic firm. In this case, the government optimally sets
γ so as to encourage offshoring, i.e. γ = γr(α, ω2,K).
(ii) If K > max{K◦,K◦◦}, offshoring harms consumers and the domestic firm.
Thus, the government will set γ so as to discourage offshoring, i.e. γ = 1/2.
Remark 1: Assume β = 1. If min{K◦,K◦◦} < K < max{K◦,K◦◦}, off-
shoring harms one of these groups (respectively consumers or the domestic firm)
but proves to be beneficial from the point-of-view of the other. Thus, the con-
ditions in propositions 1 to 3 that guarantee that a relocation is profitable are
not tight. In particular, from a ‘pro-business’ perspective, the relocation might
be profitable in more cases than the ones identified in those propositions.
Welfare effects on workers Concerning the effects of a relocation on do-
mestic workers, we arrive at the following conclusions. As in our framework
there is no complementarity in production among the goods produced in each
firm, it is not surprising that offshoring results in a lower level of total domes-
tic employment. Evaluating equations (9) and (12) in the optimum, we obtain
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2q(α, γn) > q1(α, γr, ω2).
17 As to the role of the labour union regarding the
extent of relocation-related job losses we remark the following.
Remark 2: Assume β = 1. The stronger the domestic union, the fewer jobs
are lost due to relocation.
To see this, consider how α affects the change in domestic employment following
a relocation. Partial differentiation yields
∂ [2q(α)− q1(α, ω2,K)]
∂α
= −
1
2
−
1
12
[
(2− ω2) +
K ∂∆
∂α
∆2
]
(34)
Since ∂∆
∂α
< 0, expression (34) is increasing with K. Substituting K by its upper
bound, K, we obtain − 12 −
(2−ω2)(2−α)
6(8−α) < 0. It follows that expression (34) is
negative for all admissible values of K. Intuitively, this follows directly from
lemma 3. Generally, a stronger union affects employment negatively. In the
relocation regime, however, two things contribute to reduce the negative effects
on employment. First, the government will attempt to counteract the negative
effects on employment associated with higher wages by reducing the level of
γ as the union strength increases. On the other hand, a strong union will be
more concerned about the destruction of jobs following relocation and thus will
moderate its wage claims accordingly. As a result, starting from a situation
where both firms are located in the domestic country and α is relatively high,
an outward relocation of firm 2 is associated with fewer relocation-related job
losses than if α were relatively lower.
Lastly, it can be shown that in most cases both the domestic net wage and
the net unemployment benefit are affected negatively when the foreign firm
relocates abroad. In particular, considering the condition set out in proposition
2, i.e. α > α(ω2) and K < K
◦, we obtain that ω1(1 − τr) < ω(1 − τn) and
br < bn.
6.2 The ‘pro-labour’ government: β = 0
Consider now a government that attaches full weight to the sum of net rents of
employed and unemployed workers.
The government’s objective function in the respective regime becomes
W (γ, τ) =
{
W˜n(τ, γ) = Rn(γ)−Bn(τ, γ) if 1/2 ≤ γ ≤ γr
W˜r(γ, τ) = Rr(γ)−Br(τ, γ) if γr ≤ γ ≤ γ(ω2)
(35)
where Rn(γ) = 2ω(γ)q(γ) and Rr(γ) = ω1(γ)q1(γ) denote the gross rents of do-
mestic workers in the regime without and with offshoring, respectively.18 Notice
17From equations (9) and (12) we obtain that γr − γn >
ω2−2
2
since ω2 < 2 and γn < γr.
18One way of interpreting the objective function involves expressing it in terms of the union
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that these rents are concave in γ which means that they increase for sufficiently
low γ as higher labour taxes and benefits exert upward pressure on wage claims
up to a point where the negative impact of γ on employment dominates the
former effect.19 In what follows we apply the same procedure as in the previous
section and derive the optimum levels of τ and b in both regimes.
6.2.1 No relocation regime
We start by considering the Lagrangean function
Ψ(τ, γ, ν, ρ1, ρ2) = Rn(γ) + (ν − 1)Bn(τ, γ) + ρ1(γ −
1
2
) + ρ2(γr − γ)
In this case, ∂Bn
∂τ
> 0 implies that ν = 1 and thus the first-order condition with
respect to γ reduces to
dRn
dγ
+ ρ1 − ρ2 = 0
Solving for γ, we obtain
γ˜n(α) =
2(1− α)
2− α
Note that 1/2 ≤ γ˜n(α) ≤ γr(α, ω2,K) is guaranteed if α < 2/3 and K >
K˜(α, ω2) := [2(4− α)− (8− α)ω2] ∆(α, ω2) where K < K˜ < K. Observe that
γ˜n(α) is decreasing in α. Hence, contrary to the ‘pro-business’ government, when
both firms produce domestically, the ‘pro-labour’ government counterbalances
a rise in the union bargaining strength by setting a respectively lower γ. At
an interior solution, it turns out that the equilibrium wage and output do not
depend on α:
ω˜n = 1 q˜n =
1
3
Being concerned with the total income of workers and unemployed, the gov-
ernment sets γ in such a way that any change in the wage rate arising from
a change in α is neutralized. Totally differentiating the wage rate given by
equation (8) with respect to α, evaluated at the interior solution, we have that
∂ω
∂α
+ ∂ω
∂γ˜n
∂γ˜n
∂α
= 0.
Using expression (19) we obtain that a balanced-budget policy would result in
the optimum domestic wage tax rate and benefit level
τ˜n(α) =
1− α
3− 2α
b˜n(α) = 2τ˜n(α)
rent, Θ. Namely, in the regime without relocation, Rn(γ)−Bn(τ, γ) = ω(1−τ)2q+b(1−2q) =
(ω − γ)(1 − τ)2q + b = Θ + b. In words, the entire labour force, which is normalised to 1,
receives an amount corresponding to the net unemployment insurance whereas the excess over
the benefit accrues to employed workers only. Analogous expressions can be found for the case
where the MNE moves offshore.
19 d
2Rn(γ)
dγ2
= 4 ∂ω
∂γ
∂q
∂γ
< 0 and
d2Rr(γ)
dγ2
= 2 ∂ω1
∂γ
∂q1
∂γ
< 0
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6.2.2 Relocation regime
The Lagrangean in this case is given by
Υ(τ, γ, ψ, ̺1, ̺2) = Rr(γ) + (ψ − 1)Br(τ, γ) + ̺1(γ − γr) + ̺2(γ − γ)
Interestingly, in this case the ‘pro-labour’ government chooses the same equi-
librium level of γ as the ‘pro-business’ government. To see this, note that in
equilibrium ψ = 1, and suppose that γ > γr(α, ω2,K); complementary slackness
then implies ̺1 = 0 and the first-order-condition with respect to γ yields
dRr
dγ
= ̺2
Now,
dRr
dγ
=
∂ω1
∂γ
[
q1(α, γ, ω2)−
2
3
ω1(α, γ, ω2)
]
where ∂ω1
∂γ
> 0 and the term in brackets is negative if γ > γ∗(α, ω2) :=
(1−α)(2+ω2)
2(2−α) . It turns out that if K > K˜, which is required for an interior
solution in the no-relocation case, we obtain γr(α, ω2,K) > γ
∗(α, ω2) and thus
dRr
dγ
< 0 for all γ ≥ γr which contradicts nonnegativity of ̺2. Consequently,
in equilibrium, γ = γr(α, ω2,K) and the wage and output levels are given by
equations (27) and (28).
6.2.3 The welfare impact of offshoring
Recall that the ‘pro-labour’ government places full weight on the rents of em-
ployed and unemployed workers. In anticipation of how fiscal policy is going
to affect wage bargaining and the competition in the product market, the gov-
ernment chooses γ so as to maximise workers’ rents. The resulting equilibrium
welfare levels under a balanced-budget policy, without and with import compe-
tition, respectively, are given by
W˜n(γ˜n) = 2ω˜nq˜n W˜r(γr) = ω1(α, γr, ω2)q1(α, γr, ω2)
Proposition 6: Assume β = 0. The government will optimally set its policy so
as to discourage relocation because the sum of net wages and benefits is larger
when both firms produce in the domestic country.
Proof. Using expressions (8), (9), (11) and (12), the difference between the
welfare levels is given by
W˜n(γ˜n)− W˜r(γr) =
4(2− α)(γ2r − γ˜
2
n) + 4(1− α) [4γ˜n − (2 + ω2)γr] + α
[
16− (2 + ω2)
2
]
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Note that the last term in square brackets is nonnegative since ω2 ≤ 2. We pro-
ceed by showing that the addition of the first two terms is positive; in particular,
it is enough to show that:
(2− α)(γ2r − γ˜
2
n) ≥ (1− α) [(2 + ω2)γr − 4γ˜n]
which can be rewritten as
γr [(2− α)γr − (1− α)(2 + ω2)] ≥ γ˜n [(2− α)γ˜n − 4(1− α)]
Exploiting the fact that γr ≥ γ˜n, by construction, we focus on the terms in
square brackets to show that
(2− α)(γr − γ˜n) ≥ (1− α)(ω2 − 2)
which is always fulfilled because the last term on the right-hand side is non-
positive for ω2 ≤ 2.
Welfare effects on the domestic producer and consumers Although
the ‘pro-labour’ government does not attach any weight to producers’ and con-
sumers’ welfare, it is interesting to see how its policy affects these groups.
Recall that if α < 2/3 and K > K˜(α, ω2), we obtain an interior solution in the
regime without offshoring, namely, γ = γ˜n(α). Using expressions (30) and (32),
evaluated at the interior solution, we find that offshoring increases the domestic
producer’s profit if
K < K˜◦(α, ω2) := [2(2 + α)− (4 + α)ω2] ∆(α, ω2)
and leads to a rise in the consumer surplus if
K < K˜◦◦(α, ω2) := [2(8 + α)− (16 + α)ω2)] ∆(α, ω2)
where K < K˜◦ < K. Note that if ω2 > 1, we obtain that K˜
◦◦ < K˜ < K˜◦. If
ω2 < 1 and
α < α˜(ω2) :=
2(1− ω2)
2− ω2
we have that K˜◦ < K˜ < K˜◦◦ whereas if ω2 < 1 and α > α˜(ω2), we obtain that
K˜ < K˜◦ < K˜◦◦.
We can summarise our findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 7: Assume β = 0. If α < 2/3 and K > K˜, the government sets
γ = γ˜n(α), where 1/2 < γ˜n(α) < γr(α, ω2,K).
(i) If ω2 > 1, the outward relocation of the MNE always harms consumers but
benefits the domestic producer if K ∈]K˜, K˜◦[.
(ii) If ω2 < 1 and α < α˜(ω2), offshoring benefits consumers if K ∈]K˜, K˜
◦◦[
whereas the domestic producer always becomes worse off.
(iii) If ω2 ≤ 1 and α > α˜(ω2), offshoring benefits both the domestic producer
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and consumers if K ∈]K˜, K˜◦[ where K˜◦ ≤ K˜◦◦.
Proposition 7 shows that, in the interior solution, for every combination of
α and ω2 there exists a range of relocation costs where either the consumers or
the domestic producer or both are better off when the MNE produces abroad.
Particularly, a strong domestic labour union, low foreign wages, and low relo-
cation costs as in (iii) work so as to reduce domestic wages to the extent that
total and domestic output increase due to the relocation.
We now turn to consider the cases where either α ≥ 2/3 or K ≤ K˜ which repre-
sent conditions under which corner solutions emerge to the problem in section
6.2.1.
Remark 3: Assume β = 0 and α ≥ 2/3. Then the ‘pro-labour’ government
sets the optimum γ equal to 1/2 in the regime without relocation. This corre-
sponds to the policy of the ‘pro-business’ government. Although the ‘pro-labour’
government always discourages offshoring, there would be potential gains from
relocation for domestic consumers and producers as given in propositions 1 to
5. A technical restriction must be taken into account; depending on the value of
ω2, the thresholds α and α can be smaller or larger than 2/3 and thus only some
of the results in propositions 2 to 4 may be relevant. In particular, for ω2 < 4/5
we have α < 2/3 and only proposition 2 may hold for α ≥ 2/3. Analogously, for
4/5 < ω2 < 1, we have α < 2/3 < α and propositions 2 and 4 may hold; finally,
for ω2 > 1, we have 2/3 < α and all the parameter constellations in propositions
2, 3, and 4 are possible.
Note, however, that the ‘pro-business’ and the ‘pro-labour’ governments would
implement the same low tax/transfer policy (γ = 1/2) if relocation costs were
sufficiently high, i.e. K > max{K◦,K◦◦} as in proposition 5 (ii).
Remark 4: Assume β = 0, α < 2/3 and K ≤ K˜. Then the ‘pro-labour’
government does not change its policy conditional upon the location of the
MNE and sets γ = γr(α, ω2,K) in both regimes. This corresponds to the ‘pro-
business’ government’s choice with relocation. To see how domestic consumers’
and producer’s welfare is affected by the outward relocation of the MNE, we
can check the conditions given by expressions (30) and (32) when γn = γr. We
obtain that both groups would favour offshoring if |K| < K̂(α, ω2) := 3α(2 −
ω2)∆(α, ω2) Since K̂ < K, for all admissible values of K only consumers benefit
from offshoring.
Looking at expressions (9) and (12), we observe that the negative impact of the
policy variable γ on the domestic firm’s output and employment is stronger when
the MNE is producing in the foreign country and that this effect is reinforced for
lower α. Therefore, for low values of α the domestic producer can only benefit
from the MNE’s relocation if γ is sufficiently low. For γ = γr(α, ω2,K) this
translates into sufficiently low relocation costs, namely, K < K̂. On the other
hand, notice that if the MNE produces abroad, its output is increasing in γ.
Thus, for total domestic output and consumers’ surplus to rise after relocation,
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γ and thus K must be sufficiently high to offset the negative impact on the
domestic firm’s output, i.e. K > −K̂.
6.3 Equal weights
The previous sections have shown that the value of β, along with the other
parameters α, ω2, and K, determine whether the government does or does not
favour offshoring. In order to better understand the mechanism through which
labour taxes and unemployment insurance benefits affect the equilibrium, we
have so far restricted the analysis to polar weights, i.e. β = 1 and β = 0. The
question arises as to which policy a more egalitarian government, that would
to some extent reconcile efficiency and equity goals, would endorse. For this
purpose, let Λβn(γ, τ) and Λ
β
r (γ, τ) denote welfare without and with offshoring,
respectively, for a given value of β where
Λβn(γ, τ) = βWn(γ) + (1− β)W˜n(γ, τ)
and
Λβr (γ, τ) = βWr(γ) + (1− β)W˜r(γ, τ).
Recall from expressions (18) and (35) that Wn and Wr correspond to the sum
of domestic consumer and producer surplus and that W˜n and W˜r correspond to
employed and unemployed workers’ rents without and with relocation, respec-
tively.
In order to simplify the analysis, suppose that β = 1−β = 1/2. We show in the
appendix that in this case the optimum levels of γ with and without offshoring
are identical to the levels chosen by the ‘pro-business’ government. Moreover,
we also show that the welfare function in the relocation regime evaluated at the
optimum, Λr(γr), is increasing in α and decreasing in K. To understand the
forces at work, recall on the one hand from lemma 3 that in the relocation regime
the government reacts to an increase in the degree of union bargaining power
by setting a lower tax/transfer package which results in lower domestic wages.
Consequently, not only domestic and total output but also workers’ rents are in-
creasing in α because the positive effect on employment outweighs the negative
effect on employed and unemployed workers’ payoffs. On the other hand, higher
relocation costs strengthen the bargaining position of domestic workers to the
extent that the negative effect on total and domestic firms’ output dominates
the positive effect on wages.
In order to assess the welfare implications of offshoring, we adopt the follow-
ing strategy. We choose a set of parameter values that constitute the most
favourable conditions for relocation to improve welfare and show that even under
these circumstances welfare deteriorates due to relocation. Thus, we set α = 1
and K = K(α, ω2).
20 It follows that K(ω2) = (8− 7ω2)∆, q1(ω2) =
1
6 (1 + ω2),
q2(ω2) =
1
12 (11−7ω2), ω1(ω2) =
1
4 (3+ω2), ω = 5/4, q = 1/4. Substituting these
expressions into the welfare functions, we obtain Λr(γr) < Λn(1/2). Hence, the
20These parameter values require that ω2 ≤ 11/7 for an interior solution in equation (12).
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following proposition holds.
Proposition 8: If β = 1/2, the government optimally chooses a low tax/transfer
package, γ = 1/2, so as to discourage relocation.
In general, one can check that for β sufficiently high, the government opti-
mally sets the lowest possible tax/transfer package in the regimes without and
with offshoring, i.e. it sets γn = 1/2 and γr(α, ω2,K) in the respective case.
Proposition 8 would also apply to that case. Indeed, offshoring improves welfare
if and only if
Λβr (γr) > Λ
β
n(1/2) which requires that
β > β∗ :=
1
1 + Π
(36)
where
Π :=
Wr(γr)−Wn(1/2)
W˜n(1/2)− W˜r(γr)
Recall from section 6.2.3 that in equilibrium W˜n(1/2) > W˜r(γr). Since condition
(36) can only be satisfied if β∗ < 1, welfare can only increase due to offshoring
if Wr(γr) > Wn(1/2), that is, if the sum of domestic consumer and producer
surplus rises. In fact, it follows from proposition 8 that β∗ > 1/2. Thus, if
sufficient weight is attached to the welfare of domestic consumers and producers,
offshoring could be favoured by the government. In particular, the weight must
be higher than 1/2.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper takes a political economy approach in analysing labour taxation and
redistributive policy with non-competitive labour and goods markets, assum-
ing that firms are partly mobile. In particular, the focus of attention lies in the
interaction between a foreign-owned MNE, an immobile domestic firm, a domes-
tic labour union, and a government. We show that it may be optimal for the
government to strategically induce an outward relocation of the foreign-owned
firm if two conditions are fulfilled, namely, if a) the government’s objective is
predominantly inclined towards maximising the rents of domestic consumers
and producers rather than the rents going to the labour force in the form of
net wage and transfer incomes (the so-called ‘pro-business’ government), and if
b) the MNE’s incentives to relocate, as measured by the sunk offshoring costs,
the domestic labour union’s bargaining strength, and the foreign labour costs
are sufficiently strong. Otherwise, it is optimal for the government to discour-
age a relocation of industrial activity by setting an accordingly lower labour
tax/transfer package.
In a way, we complement Leahy and Montagna’s (2000) finding that inward
FDI may not be welfare improving when the government is limited to using
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lump-sum policies, by finding circumstances under which it may be desirable
to encourage outward FDI through labour taxation policies. In both cases the
reason is to be found in the negative (positive) effect on domestic firms’ prof-
its when a competing MNE locates its plant in the domestic (foreign) country,
provided that domestic labour is unionised.
From the perspective of workers, offshoring is shown to be disfavourable as work-
ers are assumed to have no other income than wage income and the gains from
offshoring are assumed to accrue to firm owners only. At first glance, it seems
as if union bargaining could be a mechanism by which profits could flow to
workers. However, we show that this is not attained because the union distorts
competition thereby putting the domestic firm in a labour cost disadvantage.
Alternatively, one could assume that the firm is at least partly owned by work-
ers. To the extent that workers are share owners, the loss in wage income could
be partly offset by the gain in capital income.
Our analysis offers a potential explanation why high labour income taxes are
sustainable even if they are detrimental for the labour market as a whole: high
labour taxes stimulate mobile firms to relocate to lower wage countries from
which they compete in the domestic market, thereby putting pressure on the
domestic labour union. As a result, domestic producers and consumers benefit.
A Appendix
A.1 Equal weights: β = 1− β = 1/2
If the MNE does not offshore and the government attaches equal weights to the
sum of consumer and producer surplus, on the one hand, and to the rents of
workers, on the other hand, the Lagrangean function becomes
Π(τ, γ, ξ,̟1,̟2) =
1
2
Wn(γ) +
1
2
W˜n(τ, γ) + ξBn(τ, γ) +̟1(γ −
1
2
) +̟2(γr − γ) =
1
2
[
3q2(γ) +Rn(γ)
]
+ (ξ −
1
2
)Bn(τ, γ) +̟1(γ −
1
2
) +̟2(γr − γ)
Since the budget is increasing in τ , in equilibrium ξ = 1/2. As in section 6.1, it
is easy to show that the equilibrium level of γ cannot exceed 1/2. To this end,
we take the first-order condition with respect to γ and suppose that γ > 1/2 so
that
3q(γ)
∂q
∂γ
+
1
2
∂Rn
∂γ
= ̟2 (37)
We can rewrite this expression by substituting ∂Rn
∂γ
= 2 ∂q
∂γ
(ω−3q) which reduces
the left-hand side of expression (37) to w ∂q
∂γ
< 0 and yet again contradicts the
nonnegativity constraint on the multiplier. Thus, in equilibrium γ = 1/2.
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In the regime with relocation the Lagrangean is given by
Σ(τ, γ, ς, o1, o2) =
1
2
Wr(γ) +
1
2
W˜r(τ, γ) + ςBr(τ, γ) + o1(γ −
1
2
) + o2(γr − γ) =
1
2
[
1
2
[q1(γ) + q2(γ)]
2
+ q21(γ) +Rr(γ)
]
+ (ς −
1
2
)Br(τ, γ)
+ o1(γ −
1
2 ) + o2(γr − γ)
Again, the first-order condition with respect to τ yields ς = 1/2. If we suppose
that γ > γr, partial differentiation with respect to γ yields
1
2
[
(q1 + q2)
∂(q1 + q2)
∂γ
+ 2q1
∂q1
∂γ
+
∂Rr
∂γ
]
= o2 (38)
Notice that ∂(q1+q2)
∂γ
< 0. If we substitute ∂Rr
∂γ
= ∂q1
∂γ
(ω1 −
3
2q1) the left-hand
side of equation (38) becomes negative so that in the relocation equilibrium we
have that γ = γr.
A.2 Welfare impact of α and K when β = 1/2
∂Λr
∂α
= (q1 + q2)
∂(q1 + q2)
∂α
+ 2q1
∂q1
∂α
+
∂q1
∂α
(
ω1 −
2
3
q1
)
where
∂q1
∂α
=
(2− ω2)
12
[
1−
K∆−1
(8− α)(2− ω2)
]
> 0
for K ≤ K(α, ω2) and
∂(q1 + q2)
∂α
=
1
2
∂q1
∂α
> 0
Since, moreover, ω1(α, ω2,K) −
2
3q1(α, ω2,K) > 0, we have that the welfare
function with relocation is increasing in α. Analogously, it can be shown that
Λr(γr) is decreasing in relocation costs, since
∂Λr
∂K
= (q1 + q2)
∂(q1 + q2)
∂K
+
∂q1
∂K
(
2q1 + ω1 −
3
2
q1
)
< 0
On the other hand,
∂Λn
∂α
=
∂q
∂α
[6q + 2(ω − 3q)] < 0
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